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Abstract: Forecasts of differences in growth between 
countries serve an important role in the justification of 
governments’ fiscal policy stances, but are not tested for 
their accuracy as part of the current range of forecast 
evaluation methods. This paper examines forecasted and 
outturn growth differentials between countries to identify 
if there is usefulness in forecasts of “relative” growth. 
Using OECD forecasts and outturn values for GDP 
growth for (combinations of) the G7 countries between 
1984 and 2010, the paper finds that the OECD’s success 
in predicting the relative growth of G7 countries during 
this period is good. For each two-country combination 
results indicate that relative growth forecasts are less 
useful for countries which have smaller outturn growth 
differentials. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The accuracy of forecasts of macroeconomic variables, such as growth, is the subject of a 
large academic literature. Conventional forecast accuracy tests compare forecasted and outturn 
values, describing differences as the “error” of the forecast. Quantitative forecast accuracy 
statistics have been used to reveal the accuracy of a forecaster or forecasting organisation (Artis, 
1996, Granger, 1996; Melliss and Whittaker, 1998; Timmerman, 2006) or to compare the 
accuracy of different forecasters (Mills and Pepper, 1999; Öller and Barot, 2000; Pons, 2000; 
Batchelor, 2001; Loungani, 2001). A second group of forecast evaluation techniques explores 
forecasts qualitative accuracy. This includes the “directional test” (Merton, 1981) in which 
forecasts of the direction of change in a variable between years are compared to the actual 
direction of change in that variable. For example a forecast may indicate whether annual GDP 
growth will be above (below) a specific rate. The directional test uses contingency tables to 
evaluate the independence of forecasts and outturn change in a variable and also has significant 
usefulness for the users of forecasts. For example, Melander et al. (2007, p. 17) note that “this 
[test] may be more important than the forecast [quantitative] value”. Being able to correctly 
predict the direction of change is the only aspect of the usefulness of forecasts discussed in 
Stekler (1991)’s review of forecast evaluation techniques. There is, however, another way in 
which forecasts could be useful to users: where forecasts for more than one country are produced 
at the same time and countries relative growth prospects are compared.  
Comparisons of national growth prospects are a standard part of modern political and 
economic discourse. In support of the economic position adopted in the UK Coalition Budget of 
March 2011 (HM Treasury, 2011), the Chancellor George Osborne stated – “In recent months, 
many other countries have seen their ratings downgraded and their borrowing costs soar. Our 
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country’s fiscal plans have been strongly endorsed by the IMF, by the European Commission, by 
the OECD, and by every reputable business body in Britain… [European Commission forecasts] 
show that the UK is forecast to grow more strongly in the coming year than Spain, Italy, France, 
the average for the Eurozone and the average for the EU”. In the same month, the Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury (Mark Hoban MP) further directly compared countries growth 
forecasts, stating: “The IMF’s latest forecast shows the UK economy growing this year, and 
growing faster than the economies of France, Germany and Italy next year” (Hansard, 2011, col. 
750).   
Comparisons of national growth forecasts are not limited to the UK. During a speech in 
January 2012, the New Zealand Prime Minister John Key, when discussing the impact of his 
government’s fiscal plans for the new parliament on economic growth, stated: “So anyone who 
complains that New Zealand isn’t growing at four, five or six per cent a year right now is on the 
wrong planet. In fact, we are doing better than most developed countries. In both 2012 and 2013, 
the New Zealand economy is forecast to grow more strongly than the Eurozone, the UK, Japan, 
the United States and Canada. So we are in relatively good shape” (Key, 2012). 
A similar sentiment was echoed in the speech by Jim Flaherty, the Canadian Minister of 
Finance, in March 2012, when, discussing Canada’s economic prospects, he stated: “I can assure 
you that on the fiscal track we are on, [the net debt to GDP ratio] will return to where it was 
before the plan in the medium term. Also, the OECD and IMF predict that our economy will be 
among the leaders of the industrialised world over the next two years” (Flaherty, 2012). While 
the quantitative accuracy of economic forecasts is likely critical for revenue projections, and 
therefore spending decisions, these statements from across the world indicate that relative growth 
forecasts are used to justify the fiscal policy stances taken by national governments. 
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This paper therefore suggests a new qualitative forecast accuracy test which can be used 
to understand the usefulness of forecasts of relative growth between two countries produced by a 
single forecaster at a given point in time. This paper is concerned with developing and presenting 
results from a simple test for evaluating the relative outturn (i.e. actual) growth of nations against 
their forecasted relative growth. The proposed test compares the predicted sign (i.e. positive or 
negative) of the differential between growth forecasts and the sign of the outturn differential 
between outturn growth rates for those countries. This test will be useful to users of forecasts as 
countries forecasted relative growth rates have been used to justify fiscal plans: this test should 
explain whether such a use of forecasts would appear appropriate. 
In Section 2 we summarise the literature on forecast evaluation techniques, showing that 
these omit the important “relative” dimension. Section 3 describes the calculation of statistics on 
relative forecast accuracy and the use of contingency tables. Section 4 outlines the data used and 
presents the results from assessing the accuracy of relative growth forecasts. This new qualitative 
forecast evaluation approach is tested using annual OECD GDP growth forecasts for the G7 
countries between 1984 and 2010
2
. In aggregate, the results indicate that we can reject a null of 
independence between the OECD’s forecasts for the relative growth of G7 countries and their 
outturn relative growth. Considering each two-country combination of G7 countries in turn over 
this period, the results are mixed. Our results suggest that countries with smaller outturn growth 
differentials are less likely to see their relative growth correctly predicted. Section 5 offers the 
conclusions from this paper and outlines some areas for further work in the evaluation of the 
accuracy of relative forecasts of economic growth.
 
 
 
                                                          
2
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2. Forecast evaluation approaches  
2.1 Quantitative forecast accuracy tests 
Conventional forecast evaluation techniques explore the accuracy or the efficiency of 
forecasts of a particular variable (e.g. a growth rate in year t, or year t inflation rate). Forecast 
efficiency refers to the notion that forecasts are unbiased (i.e. they are neither systematically 
positive nor negative predictors of the outturn value). Techniques for evaluating the efficiency of 
forecasts can involve regression analysis of forecast and outturn data. Mills and Pepper (1999, p. 
250) define optimal forecasts as “both unbiased and efficient”.  
Here we described existing tests of forecast accuracy. These compare ex ante and ex post 
data on specific variables and calculate the “forecast error” as the difference between that 
forecasted and the outturn value for that variable. Figure 1 shows how forecast errors are 
calculated, illustrating this for a hypothetical scenario of three separate growth forecasts for 
country A’s growth in year t, each made in year t, (
AF 1,1 ,
AF 2,2  
and
AF 3,3 ) and three outturn values for 
country A’s growth ( AY1 ,
AY2  and
AY3 )
3
. The forecast error is given by the distance between the 
forecast and the outturn value (e.g. the first forecast’s error, 
AAA YFe 11,11,1  ). A positive 
(negative) forecast error indicates that the forecast was greater (lower) than the outturn value.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Empirical measures for quantitative forecast accuracy require a time series of forecast 
errors for a specific forecaster, and capture the quantitative accuracy of macroeconomic forecasts 
                                                          
3
 In practice, (preliminary) growth outturn values are typically available three months after the end of the final 
quarter of the year. 
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in a single variable. Such measures include Mean Error (ME), Mean Absolute Error (MAE), 
Root Mean Square Error (RMSE), Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE) (some, or all, of 
these measures are used in, for example, Granger, 1996; Melliss and Whittaker,  1998; and Mills 
and Pepper, 1999; Pons, 2000; Timmerman, 2006).  
With the hypothetical forecast errors from Figure 1, these tests are formally: 
 ME = neee /)( 3,32,21,1   
 MAE = neee /)( 3,32,21,1   
 RMSE =   neee /)()()( 23,322,221,1   
 MAPE =   nYeYeYe /)/()/()/( 33,322,211,1   
where n is the number of forecasts (i.e. three in this case) and Y is the mean outturn value 
over the sample. What these values report is the closeness (i.e. the accuracy) between forecasts 
and outturn values. Smaller values for each measure suggest that forecasts are more accurate (i.e. 
errors are smaller) over the period covered. 
There is a significant literature examining the accuracy of forecasts made by international 
organisations, such as the IMF or OECD (Artis, 1996; Koutsogeorgopoulou, 2000; Pons, 2000; 
Timmerman, 2006,). These studies have “found that the forecast errors are by and large non-
systematic, and the forecasts prepared by the IMF and OECD are generally unbiased and 
efficient” (Krkoska and Teksoz (2007, p. 31). In addition, many studies have compared the 
forecast accuracy of private and public institutions. Batchelor (2001) compares the growth 
forecasts of the OECD and IMF with private sector forecasts for the G7 between 1990 and 1999. 
He finds that private sector forecasts are less biased and have a lower mean absolute error 
(MAE). Similar work by Artis (1996), Mills and Pepper (1999) Öller and Barot (2000) and 
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Loungani (2001), found no major differences in the forecast accuracy of public or private bodies. 
Mills and Pepper (1999) review the accuracy of the UK’s major forecasting organisations and 
find that there forecasts typically have high correlations and are poor predictors of major 
economic events.  
 
2.2 Qualitative forecast accuracy tests 
The most common qualitative test of forecast accuracy is the “directional” test (Schnader 
and Stekler, 1990). This examines if forecasts correctly predict the direction of change in a 
variable from one year to another, i.e. for a given country, is growth next year forecast to be 
higher or lower than growth this year? The usefulness of being able to accurately forecast the 
direction of change is acknowledged throughout the academic literature. Leitch and Tanner 
(1995) for example, argue that what “quantitative” accuracy tests are of little importance for 
business users of forecasts who are more concerned about the direction of the forecast (Öller and 
Barot, 2000). Pons (2000, p. 59) notes, this analyses is only concerned with the direction of the 
predicted and actual changes and that “small and large [absolute forecast] errors are treated 
equally in this classification scheme”. Interestingly, Stekler (1991) takes the directional test as 
the only useful measure of forecast accuracy for decision makers.  
The direction of growth from one year to the next, as forecasted by different 
organisations, has been studied in the recent academic literature (Öller and Barot, 2000; Pons, 
2000; Ashiya, 2003; Greer, 2003; Ashiya, 2006). Studies using this measure have typically found 
that international organisations such as the OECD and IMF are good predictors of the direction 
of countries growth, particularly for closer forecast horizons (e.g. Pons, 2000). 
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One test for the directional accuracy of a growth forecast uses a 2x2 contingency table 
(Merton, 1981, Stekler, 1991). Showing forecasted increases or decreases in a variable, e.g. 
GDP, and outturn increases or decreases in that same variable, there are four possible domains 
for any forecast, which can be represented as in Table 1 (Pons, 2000). Higher directional 
accuracy would be consistent with the sum of the entries in the diagonal of Table 1 (n00+ n11) 
being high. Stekler (1991) follows Merton’s (1981) original test and details a 2x2 contingency 
table similar to Table 1 in which conditional probabilities of the change in a variable being up 
(down) when the forecast is for it to increase (decrease) are used to test if the sign of the 
forecasted change is independent of the actual change. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
The most straightforward test for independence in a contingency table (Stekler, 1991) is 
to use the Chi-squared test. The 2 test statistic for Table 1, adjusted for Yates’ continuity 
correction, can be calculated using: 
 
 

 


1
0
1
0 ..
2
..2
/
/)5.0)(
i j ji
jiij
Nnn
Nnnn
  with d.f.=1.  
 
Where nij refers to the number of instances of forecasted direction i and outturn direction 
j, and there are N total observations. The 10%, 5% and 1% values for the test statistic of the 2
distribution are 3.84, 6.63 and 10.83 respectively. Our null hypothesis is that observations of 
forecasted change and outturn change are independent. A 2  value greater than the critical 
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values indicates that we can reject this null, and conclude that there exists a positive association 
between the forecast and outturn directions of growth (Greer, 2003).  
 
3. Relative forecast accuracy 
3.1 Describing relative forecast and outturn differences 
The quantitative or qualitative forecast accuracy measures examined in Section 2 do not 
consider how to evaluate whether relative forecasts of growth for different countries are 
accurate. What we propose is a qualitative directional test of economic forecast accuracy which 
can be used to evaluate the relative accuracy of forecasts, and which uses the contingency table 
approach of the directional test to see if forecasts of relative growth are useful for policymakers. 
The relative forecast accuracy test compares the forecasted growth differential between 
two countries and the outturn growth differential outcomes for those two countries. For example, 
if country A was forecast to grow more (less) than country B, we term this a positive (negative) 
forecasted differential. By comparing the outturn growth data for the countries we can calculate 
the outturn differential, which can also be positive or negative. Put simply, if the forecasted 
differential and outturn differential have the same sign, then relative growth was correctly 
predicted. As with the directional test, we ignore the absolute size of these differentials. 
Figure 2a shows how we calculate the relative forecast differentials for simultaneous 
forecasts for two countries (A,B) for a specific period such as a year, t ( BAttfd
,
, ). Figure 2b shows 
the calculation of outturn growth differentials for those same countries in the forecasted period (
BA
ttod
,
, ). As drawn, the forecasted growth differential is positive in the second forecast period (i.e. 
BA FF 2,22,2  ) while the outturn growth differential is negative (i.e. 
BA YY 2,22,2  ). For the other two 
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forecasts for each country the sign of the forecast and outturn growth differentials are the same, 
although their absolute size. 
 
[Figure 2a here] 
[Figure 2b here] 
 
There are therefore two possible outcomes for the forecast growth differential (positive or 
negative) and the outturn growth differentials (positive and negative). These options give rise to 
four possible outcomes. Two possible outcomes relate to correct forecasts (the forecast and 
outturn differentials were either both positive or both negative) while two possible outcomes 
relate to incorrect forecasts: either the forecast was for a positive growth differential and the 
outturn differential negative, or vice versa. We can construct a 2x2 contingency table to show the 
outcomes of forecasted relative growth and the outturn relative growth. Replacing the forecasted 
and observed growth direction (from the directional test, described above) with forecasted and 
observed relative growth we can create Table 2. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
The 2 test statistic for relative forecast accuracy in Table 2 is again, adjusted for Yates’ 
continuity correction, is: 
 

 


1
0
1
0 ..
2
..2
/
/)5.0)(
i j ji
jiij
Rrr
Rrrr
  with d.f.=1.  
 
Page 10 
 
Where rij refers to the number of instances of forecasted direction i and outturn direction j, and 
there are R total observations. As before, the 10%, 5% and 1% values for the test statistic of the 
2 distribution are 3.84, 6.63 and 10.83 respectively, and our null hypothesis is that all 
observations are independent. A 2  value greater than these critical values indicates that we can 
reject this null and say that there exists a positive association between the forecast and outturn 
relative directions of growth. 
 
4.  Data  
4.1 Sources 
To demonstrate the test of relative forecast accuracy we require real GDP growth 
forecasts and outturn values for a sample of countries over a period of time. We use the OECD’s 
Economic Outlook as the basis for the forecasts, taking forecasts of growth in the G7 countries 
from the June publication of the EO for each year between 1984 and 2010. Outturn growth for 
each year is taken from the latest publication of the Economic Outlook
4
. The forecasts therefore 
are produced at the around six months into the year to which they relate. For example, we take 
the forecasts for growth in 2005 for each G7 country as published in the EO from June of 2005. 
Relative forecast and outturn growth differentials are calculated for each two-country 
combination of G7 countries from the data for each country, making twenty-one two-country 
combinations in all (e.g. UK against USA, UK against Germany, Germany against USA, etc.). 
We are therefore comparing the direction of forecasted growth differentials between G7 
                                                          
4
 These were accessed in February 2012 and relate to annual growth rates of real GDP (or GNP where GDP figures 
do not exist, typically earlier in the sample). Figures for Germany between 1984 and 1990 are estimated by the 
OECD, as they relate to the period before the unification of East and West Germany. All data on forecasts and 
outturns growth rates are available from the author on request. 
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countries around the middle of each year (as published in that year) and outturn growth 
differentials as available now.  
Using the G7 countries provides us with a manageable sub-grouping of OECD 
economies. It is also typical that the growth prospects of each country within the G7 be 
compared against other G7 countries, rather than developing countries, which may be on quite 
different growth trajectories. All of the example of statements by finance ministers seen in the 
introduction, for example, compare against other development economies. Many of the 
quantitative and qualitative tests of forecast accuracy have used the forecasts made by 
international organisations (such as the OECD) as they are timely, publicly available and 
produced for a range of countries at one instance.  
 
4.2 Calculation of relative forecast accuracy measures 
To illustrate the calculations, we show the relative growth forecasts and outturn data for 
the UK compared to Germany between 1984 and 2010. This demonstrates many of the issues 
with regard to the calculation of this measure and the test statistic. Figure 3 shows the forecasted 
and outturn growth differentials between the UK and Germany. The year to which the forecast 
and outturn growth differential relates is shown on the horizontal axis. The forecast and outturn 
growth differentials are compared to the UK, therefore a positive value indicates that for that 
year forecast (or outturn) growth was higher (i.e. more positive) than Germany. 
 
[Figure 3 here] 
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Figure 3 shows that in fourteen years
5
 of our sample the forecasted and outturn growth 
differential was positive, i.e. the UK was forecast to grow by more than Germany in the year and 
did so, while in eight cases
6
 the forecast differential and outturn differential was negative. In all 
then, in twenty-two years of the twenty-seven years, the growth differential was correctly 
forecast. Other years saw incorrect forecasts. By grouping forecast and outturn growth 
differentials by their signs, as described in Section 3, we can construct 2x2 contingency tables 
for each two-country comparison, as well as for all two-country comparisons. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Testing relative forecast accuracy using contingency tables and 2  - all observations 
Table 3 shows the forecast and outturn relative growth contingency table for the twenty-
one combinations of two-country comparisons in each of the twenty-seven years of the sample 
period (1984 to 2010). This gives a total of 567 relative growth forecasts and outturn 
observations, which must lie in one of the four quadrants of Table 3
7
.  
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
Looking at Table 3, we can see that in 455 out of 567 observations, the forecasted relative 
growth differential was the same as the outturn differential. This means that considering the 
aggregate forecasts, the OECD’s forecasts of the relative growth of G7 countries was correct on 
                                                          
5
 Specifically, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2009. 
6
 Specifically, 1984, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 2007, 2008 and 2010. 
7
 The construction of the two-country combinations of G7 member countries means that we have compared each 
combination on one occasion only. For example, we have compared the UK to the USA, and not also the other way 
round. This means that each year of positive forecasted relative growth would not be matched by a year of negative 
relative growth – we have not compared the USA to the UK as well as the UK and USA. Therefore in Table 1we do 
not have equal numbers of positive and negative forecasts or observed outturn growth observations. 
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over 80% of occasions. The 2 statistic for Table 3 is 207.5 – significantly above the 1% critical 
value of 10.83 – and indicating that we can reject the null hypothesis that the forecasts and 
observations are independent. There is therefore a statistically significant link between forecasts 
of relative growth and the outturn growth differential. This indicates overwhelming evidence that 
the OECD’s forecast of the relative annual growth of G7 countries over the sample period can be 
useful to users of these forecasts seeking to understand countries’ relative growth prospects over 
the horizon we have used.  
We might expect that forecasts of relative growth would become less useful as the size of 
the forecast differential reduces, i.e. relative growth forecasts may become less useful for years 
in which nations are forecast to have “broadly similar” growth prospects. We can examine if this 
is true by only considering those relative growth forecasts which lie close to zero. Specifically, 
we have recreated Table 3 for all the forecast differentials between -1 and 1. In total, over the 
sample, there were 267 such forecasts. We calculate an 2 statistic for a new 2x2 contingency 
table for these (small) forecast differentials and whether the outturn differential was positive or 
negative. For forecast differentials between -1 and 1, the 2 statistic is 30.1, which is again 
significant at the 1% level. Indeed, only for forecast differentials between -0.2 and 0.2 are 
relative forecasts of growth unable to reject a null of independence at the 1% level for our 
complete sample of forecast and outturn growth differentials (although the 2 statistic is still 
significant at the 5% level).  
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5.2 Testing relative forecast accuracy using contingency tables and 2  - country 
comparisons 
 Table 4 shows the results from examining each of the twenty-one possible two-country 
combination of G7 countries within our sample and time period. This shows that we also find 
significant 2 statistics for many of the two-country comparisons, indicating that forecasts and 
outturn growth differentials are not independent. Rows in the table are sorted by the size of the 
2  statistic, indicating that more significant relationships (less independent forecasts and outturn 
differentials) are at the top of this table.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
Two of the two-country comparisons of forecast and outturn relative growth comparisons 
(Japan and France, and UK and Japan) are significant at the 1% level.  The Japan-France 
comparison has the highest 2  statistic, as well as the highest accuracy of relative forecasts. The 
relative growth forecast between these countries was correct 25 of 27 times, while between the 
UK and Japan the sign of forecast growth differential was correct 24 times. As with Figure 3, we 
can show the quantitative scale and direction of forecast and outturn relative growth differentials 
for these two significant forecasts. Figure 4 shows the case of Japan and France, while Figure 5 
shows the comparison between the UK and Japan.  
 
[Figure 4 here] 
[Figure 5 here] 
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Looking firstly at Figure 4, we can see the high level of agreement between the 
forecasted and outturn growth for Japan and France. Breaking this period down, in the first part 
of the sample – from 1984 to 1991 – Japan was forecast to grow more than France, and did so, 
giving positive forecast and outturn differentials. From 1997 to 2002, the reverse was true, with 
Japanese growth forecast and outturn growth negative compared to France. From 2003 to 2007 
forecast and outturn growth differentials were all small in absolute terms (not exceeding 1 
percentage point in any year) with Japan particularly badly hit by the financial crises of 2008 and 
2009, but (as forecasted) responding with faster growth than France in 2010. 
Figure 5 shows for the UK and Japan a similarly high level of similarity between forecast 
and outturn growth differentials. Rather than three periods where forecast and outturn 
differentials varied in sign – like for Japan and France – this comparison has two distinct periods, 
i.e. pre-1992 (inclusive) and post-1992.Before that year, UK growth was typically (8 out of 9 
times) expected to be lower than Japanese growth, and for these years it was only 1986 where 
that was not a correct prediction. Between 1993 and 2009, however the OECD’s prediction for 
the relative growth of the UK compared to Japan was positive, i.e. the UK was expected to grow 
faster, and for each of these years (with the exception of 2006) the UK did grow faster than 
Japan. 
Table 4 also shows us that six of the twenty-one two-country comparisons do not have 
significant 2 statistics, indicating that in these cases we cannot reject our null of independence 
between forecast and outturn relative growth. These cases include the lowest relative forecast 
accuracy we find, which is between the US and Canada. The OECD’s forecasts during the 
sample period correctly predicted the relative growth between these countries on 59% of the 
years covered (getting the relative growth incorrect on 11 of the 27 years included).  
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The comparison of forecasted and outturn growth for the US and Canada is worthy of 
closer examination. Figure 6 shows the size (and signs) of the forecast and outturn growth 
differentials over the sample period for this two-country comparison. As before, this Figure is 
drawn with the same y-axis scale as Figures 1, 4 and 5.  
 
[Figure 6 here] 
 
Figure 6 shows that there are many years where the forecast and outturn growth 
differential between the US and Canada do not have the same sign. There are – as Table 4 
indicates – more years where the forecasted differential is negative, but the outturn positive, i.e. 
where USA growth was forecasted to be weaker than Canada but was not, than the opposite. One 
interesting feature of Figure 6 is that the absolute magnitudes of the differentials are very small. 
Many of the years of incorrect relative forecasts we have reported here, are where small negative 
(positive) forecasted growth differentials have seen small positive (negative) outturn growth 
differentials. There is no year when the forecasted growth differential was greater than 1.9 
percentage points, while the largest outturn growth differential was in 1992, when the USA saw 
a GDP increase of 2.5 percentage points more than Canada.  
 We have seen that the US and Canada - countries with a high degree of interdependence 
between each other – display smaller outturn growth differentials (and indeed also small 
forecasted growth differentials). This will impact upon the ability of forecasted growth 
differentials to match with outturn growth differentials. To explore this, Figure 7 shows the 
correlation between the size of average (mean) absolute outturn growth differentials for each 
two-country comparison of the G7 countries and the percentage of years that the relative growth 
Page 17 
 
differential matched the outturn growth differential for that comparison (i.e. the final column in 
Table 4).  
 
[Figure 7 here] 
 
 A simple line of best fit between the points in Figure 7 gives an upward sloping line, with 
an R2 of 37%. This indicates that there is some relationship between the size of outturn growth 
differentials and the likelihood that relative growth would be correctly forecast. The range 
around the line – with some significant outliers – suggests that this relationship is more complex 
than this simple test could capture. For instance, it appears that the relative growth of USA and 
Canada is less accurately predicted than the relative growth between France and Italy (with 
relative growth correctly predicted 74% of the time) – despite the mean outturn growth 
differentials over the sample being (marginally) smaller between France and Italy. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 Conventional forecast evaluation approaches compare the forecasted value of an 
economic variable to the outturn value of that variable. This is useful for understanding the 
accuracy and efficiency of forecasts, with a large academic literature evaluating the forecasts of 
different international, private and public forecasters. By looking at the forecasted relative 
growth of national economies, this paper explicitly captures an important dimension of forecasts: 
The relative forecasts of national economic growth have been used to justify the fiscal stances 
adopted by governments’ across the world. By explicitly considering the direction of the relative 
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forecast differential between two countries and the outturn growth differential, a standard 
contingency table test can be used to explore if relative growth forecasts contain information of 
use to users of forecasts.  
We have tested the accuracy of relative forecast of real GDP and outturn data for the G7 
countries between 1984 and 2010, produced by the OECD. The results show that in aggregate, 
forecasts of relative growth are good predictors of actual relative growth. Only for forecast 
differentials of less than 0.2 in absolute terms can we not reject a null of independence between 
forecast and outturn growth differentials. Examining country-by-country comparisons, we see 
that the accuracy of relative growth forecasts has been very good for some country combinations, 
but less accurate for some countries. There is also shown to be a relatively weak relationship 
between the size of outturn growth differentials and the accuracy of annual relative growth 
forecasts during this period.  
As the first paper exploring the accuracy of forecasts of relative growth, there is scope for 
further research into relative forecasts. For instance, we have only considered the forecasts by 
one international organisation (the OECD) over a relatively short forecasting horizon (i.e. within 
the year to which the forecast relates). The simultaneous release of forecasts for different 
countries by other international organisations (such as the IMF) could explore whether different 
organisations have the same level of success in forecasting relative growth. These organisations 
typically forecasts for two years into the future, which would allow the same test to be used on 
longer forecast horizons. Secondly, this paper has examined the G7 countries. Further work 
could explore if relative growth forecasts offer the same usefulness for developing or other non-
G7 countries. Finally, it might be possible to explore and explain some of the differences 
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between forecasted and outturn relative growth differentials by exposure to country-specific or 
international shocks. 
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Table 1: Directional accuracy contingency table 
  Predicted change  
  Positive Negative Total 
Actual change Positive n00 n01 n0. 
Negative n10 n11 n1. 
 Total n.0 n.1 N 
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Table 2: Relative forecast accuracy contingency table 
  Forecasted relative growth  
  0abtfd  0
ab
tfd  Total 
Outturn relative 
growth 
0abtod  r00 r01 r0. 
0abtod  r10 r11 r1. 
 Total r.0 r.1 R 
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Table 3: Relative forecast accuracy contingency table  
  Forecasted relative growth  
  0abtfd  0
ab
tfd  Total 
Outturn relative 
growth 
0abtod  236 70 306 
0abtod  42 219 261 
 Total 278 289 567 
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Table 4: Results from country-by-country comparisons 
  
Correct Incorrect 
 
 
X
2
 statistic 
FD and OD 
both positive 
FD and OD 
both 
negative (or 
same) 
FD negative 
or same, OD 
positive 
FD positive, 
OD negative 
or same % correct 
Japan vs. France 16.217*** 14 11 1 1 93% 
UK vs. Japan 13.232*** 16 8 3 0 89% 
UK vs. France 10.632** 16 7 4 0 85% 
USA vs. France 9.674** 19 5 2 1 89% 
USA vs. Japan 8.344** 17 6 2 2 85% 
USA vs. Germany 8.344** 17 6 2 2 85% 
UK vs. Germany 8.269** 14 8 4 1 81% 
USA vs. Italy 8.104** 20 4 1 2 89% 
Germany vs. Canada 7.542** 4 19 4 0 85% 
Japan vs. Italy 6.006* 13 8 2 4 78% 
Germany vs. France 5.542* 7 14 4 2 78% 
UK vs. USA 4.768* 5 16 5 1 78% 
Japan vs. Canada 4.688* 6 15 3 3 78% 
Italy vs. Canada 4.407* 3 20 3 1 85% 
UK vs. Italy 4.219* 18 4 3 2 81% 
Germany vs. Italy 3.546 9 10 2 6 70% 
France vs. Italy 3.546 13 7 5 2 74% 
France vs. Canada 3.271 3 19 4 1 81% 
Japan vs. Germany 2.984 11 8 3 5 70% 
UK vs. Canada 1.500 4 15 6 2 70% 
USA vs. Canada 0.390 7 9 7 4 59% 
Notes: *** = significant at the 1% level, ** = significant at the 5% level, * = significant at the 10% level. 
